COVID-19, combined with the effects of ongoing civil conflicts, hotter and drier weather in many areas, and an unfolding locust invasion in Africa and the Middle East, could cut off access to food for tens of millions of people. The world is “on the brink of a hunger pandemic,” according to World Food Program (WFP) Executive Director David Beasley, who warned the United Nations Security Council recently of the urgent need for action to avert “multiple famines of biblical proportions.”

(Watch Beasley’s conversation on food insecurity as a national security threat with his WFP predecessor, Ertharin Cousin, a visiting scholar with Stanford’s Center of Food Security and the Environment.)

Understanding how these conditions – alone or in combination – might affect crop harvests and food supply chains is essential to finding solutions, according to David Lobell, the Gloria and Richard Kushel Director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment. Below, Lobell discusses the connection between immigration and U.S. food security, a counter-intuitive effect of COVID-19 and more.

How could COVID-19 affect global food security?

I think the biggest effects will probably be related to lost incomes for many low-income people. Even if food prices don’t change, potentially hundreds of millions could be pushed into a much more precarious food situation. I’d be especially worried about remittances – the money immigrants in wealthy nations send home to developing nations – falling, since these are a surprisingly large source of stability for many poor people. Beyond the income effects, there are definitely prospects for reduced supply of foods, but I think these are secondary, especially because global stocks right now are quite large.

Another counter-intuitive effect is that the drop in gasoline demand due to social distancing may be a big driver of changes in food prices. A lot of corn demand is for use in ethanol fuel, and corn prices can affect the prices of many other crops. The price of corn has dropped by about 20 percent since February.

What are the biggest risks in terms of food supply?

Three things come to mind. First, for crops that require a lot of labor, there are some indications that planting and harvest activities are being affected. Even though these are usually included as essential activities, they often rely on migrant populations that can no longer cross state or national borders. California is going to be a prime case study in this.

Second, some countries, like Russia, have started to restrict food exports in an effort to calm domestic consumers worried about food shortages. Even if there is enough global supply, there is a risk that supply for importing countries could be curtailed. This was a big part of the food price spikes a decade ago. Now, we have the added potential that exports will be limited by a lack of mobility to get products to the port – for instance, there are reports from South America that towns won’t let trucks through for fear of the virus.

Third, COVID-19 could really limit the ability of governments and international groups to address other crises that emerge. Nearly every year there are at least a few surprises around the world affecting food that are usually handled before they make big news. Things like livestock diseases and crop pest outbreaks, for example. But without the ability to deploy people to assess and fix problems, there is more scope for issues to go unchecked. Right now, the biggest example of this is the desert locust outbreak in Eastern Africa.

What current and/or likely future weather conditions might have significant impacts on food production?

As the globe warms, we continue to see more “surprises” in most years in terms of record hot or dry growing seasons. It’s a bit too soon to say if and where those will emerge this year. Since global food stocks are high, we have some ability to cope with a shock, but if governments are already nervous it may take less to induce export bans and all of the negative effects those entail.

Ahead of the summer harvest, what is the prospect for controlling locust swarms in threatened countries, and how might the swarms further complicate the global food security picture?

If not for COVID-19, this would likely be the biggest development related to food this year. My understanding is that they are spreading fast in Africa and the Middle East, and while they haven’t yet had big effects in the main production regions, the next couple of months will be critical. The hope is that the winds change and drive them back toward the desert areas they came from. If not, there are at least 20 million people at risk of major food security impacts in the region.

Could we see locust swarms in the U.S.? What can we do to prevent them?

Locusts can occur anywhere. A few years back there was a major outbreak in Israel. They haven’t been a big issue in the U.S. because control methods are available, such as widespread spraying. But again, in a time of COVID-19, these types of responses are harder.

What does history teach us about the situation we are in with multiple threats to food security, and how to deal with it?

I think it comes down to a combination of investing in science-based solutions to avoid problems to begin with, and then having good social safety nets for when problems arise. At that level, it’s not really any different than dealing with infectious disease. The absence of any problems is our goal. At the same time, that absence always seems to breed complacency and neglect. Hopefully, the experiences of 2020 will help strengthen support for a society based on facts, science and compassion.

Media Contacts

David Lobell, Center on Food Security and the Environment: (650) 721-6207; dlobell@stanford.edu

Rob Jordan, Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment: (650) 721-1881; rjordan@stanford.edu

While Wuhan, China was the first epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic, every nation in Asia has been deeply affected by the spread of the virus. In a virtual seminar convened by the Freeman Spogli Institute, APARC experts discuss the social and economic impacts of COVID-19 and the various policy responses to the pandemic across Asian nations.

Senior Fellow Xueguang Zhou focuses on the phases of crisis response taken by the PRC in the early stages of the unfolding coronavirus outbreak. Center Fellow and Korea Program Deputy Director Yong Suk Lee discusses the policy responses of the South Korean government. Southeast Asia Program Director Don Emmerson offers a comparison of different governance strategies and actions implemented across Southeast Asian countries, while Karen Eggelston, APARC's deputy director and director of the Asia Health Policy Program, addresses the response of health systems in Japan and South Asia.

Watch the full discussion and Q&A below. You can also read the Stanford Daily's coverage of the event.

In 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) published the fourth installment in its effort to identify “megatrends” likely to shape world events a decade or more into the future. Shorenstein APARC Fellow and China expert Thomas Fingar, the then chairman of the NIC, oversaw that report, Global Trends 2025. The unclassified report uses scenarios to illustrate some of the ways in which the factors driving world events – from climate change to demographic decline to changing geopolitical powers – may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future decisionmakers. One of these scenarios is the emergence of a global pandemic that bears a chilling resemblance to COVID-19.

We sat down with Fingar for an online conversation about the NIC report and its pandemic scenario, the government action it spurred, the United States’ failed initial response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and the implications of the current crisis for U.S.-China relations. Watch:

Twelve years after its publication, the NIC’s "Potential Emergence of a Global Pandemic" scenario (p. 75) has proven to be woefully accurate:

“The emergence of a novel, highly transmissible, and virulent human respiratory illness for which there are no adequate countermeasures could initiate a global pandemic. If a pandemic disease emerges by 2025, […] it probably will first occur in an area marked by high population density and close association between humans and animals, such as many areas of China and Southeast Asia […] Slow public health response would delay the realization that a highly transmissible pathogen had emerged […] Despite limits imposed on international travel, travelers with mild symptoms or who were asymptomatic could carry the disease to other continents. Waves of new cases would occur every few months. The absence of an effective vaccine and near-universal lack of immunity would render populations vulnerable to infection.”

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It was not a prediction, recalls Fingar, but rather an attempt to urge policymakers to think “beyond tomorrow,” past the end of their administration, and to stimulate strategic thinking about how to reinforce positive trends and change or ameliorate negative ones. If the report and its global pandemic scenario are precise, he notes, it is because the NIC’s effort involved the best specialists within the U.S. intelligence community and engaged numerous and varied groups of non-U.S. Government experts.

Yet the United States has been unprepared for the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis is now worsening U.S.-China tensions. To address the crisis, however, argues Fingar, both countries must cooperate in the international fora. “Let that be the way that builds towards a better bilateral relationship.”

(This is excerpted from a story from The Mercury News.)

Long motorcades of volunteers converged at three Stanford University research sites this week, donating blood for a new test that identifies the prevalence of coronavirus in our community – and could help reveal the full scope of Santa Clara County’s epidemic.

The 2,500 test slots on Friday and Saturday filled up within hours, as news of the project — the first large scale study of its type in the U.S. — spread quickly through the county, according to this Mercury News story.

The test detects protective antibodies to the virus rather than the virus itself. This gives scientists a snapshot of how many people in the county have already been infected, but weren’t seriously sick and didn’t realize it. And it tells residents whether they carry potentially protective antibodies – so may be immune to future infection.

“This is critical information,” said principal investigator Eran Bendavid, an infectious disease specialist and associate professor of medicine with Stanford Health Policy. “We will show the country what to do and how to do it,” he said.

The project, coordinated with the Santa Clara County Department of Health, was applauded by Gov. Gavin Newsom during a Saturday press conference in Sacramento, who called it “the first home-grown serum test in the state of California.”

Read The Mercury News Story