Anton Turupalov is a political consulting and government relations professional in Ukraine with extensive experience in public service. He has previously served as Deputy Mayor of Mykolayiv, Advisor to the Minister of Healthcare of Ukraine, and Advisor to the Head of the Parliament of Ukraine. Anton's expertise lies in regional policy and local administration. As a key advisor on regional policy to the former Prime Minister of Ukraine, he played a pivotal role in implementing groundbreaking system changes, including land and administrative reform. Anton organized Ukraine's first coronavirus isolation facility during the COVID-19 pandemic under challenging circumstances. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, Anton co-organized the Assistance Coordination Center in Warsaw, a hub for coordinating humanitarian aid between Ukrainian and Polish authorities, international donors, and organizations. Currently based in Warsaw, Anton serves as an advisor to the Minister of Agriculture and Food of Ukraine.

Project Description: Anton is spearheading the creation of the Ukrainian Endowment for Democracy (UED), a platform dedicated to protecting and developing democracy in Ukraine. The UED aims to promote the transformation of the political system, establish effective institutions, and introduce equal rules of the game to build sustainable democracy. The Endowment’s mission is to promote democratic institutions, foster economic development, and support the political system’s evolution. UED will bring together responsible businesses and experienced reformers to address systemic national problems, shape the national agenda, partner with international organizations, and work on two fronts: promoting democracy and building a strong economy. It will support the development of democratic institutions, political parties, civil society organizations, and independent media, and promote Ukraine as a regional leader of democracy, as well as support Ukraine’s integration with Europe and the West.

In addition to establishing the UED, Anton is working on a secondary project focused on improving the efficiency, transparency, and responsiveness of reconstruction and humanitarian aid efforts in Ukraine. The project aims to develop a one-stop-shop system connecting international donors, relevant national government ministries, agencies, and local actors (region, town, and community-level stakeholders). This platform will enable a more transparent, efficient, and responsive mechanism for coordinating aid efforts in Ukraine, reducing corruption, improving prioritization, lowering net costs, and facilitating communication of needs and systemic issues by local administrations.

Gulsanna ("Sanna") Mamediieva led strategic planning and European integration of the digital sector of Ukraine as Director General for EU Integration at the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. She played a significant role in Ukraine’s integration into the EU Digital Single Market and the rapid digital transformation of Ukraine, including building the government ecosystem “Diia” (The State and Me), which makes it easy and secure for Ukrainians to obtain digital documents (driver’s licenses, passports, etc.), access public services online (such as paying taxes, business registration), developing digital skills, electronic communication and growth of ICT industry. This influence made Ukraine one of the world leaders in public innovation and, without exaggeration, European “digital tiger.” It also served as a backbone of Ukrainian resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic and wartime. Since February 2022, she has coordinated international technical assistance to support Ukraine’s digital resilience. Gulsanna also initiated exporting Ukrainian digital transformation experience to other countries. The first case is with Estonia, which will present its government state application, “Mrik,” which is based on Ukraine’s “Diia” app. Gulsanna currently serves as an Advisor to the Vice Prime Minister on Innovation, Technology and Education, and to the Minister of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. She is also Director for Programs and Partnerships at Digitally GovTech Center of Excellence, a member of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Artificial Intelligence, and Coordinator for Ukraine at Eastern Partnership Harmonization Digital Market initiative. She was a Visiting Fellow at the McCourt School for Public Policy at Georgetown University before arriving at Stanford this summer. She holds a Master’s degree in Information Technology Law from the University of Tartu, Estonia, and is pursuing a Ph.D. in Internet Law at Carleton University in Canada. Before her government role, Gulsanna worked as an IT lawyer at DLA Piper Ukraine, specializing in ICT and Intellectual Property.

Project Description: Sanna has a number of tech policy areas of interest. She would like to learn more about innovation strategy development, edTech, govTech, military tech, AI for public purpose, saving ecosystems, biotech and medtech, and innovation parks. She is also interested in developing solutions and learning about comparative practices for upskilling and reskilling displaced people, mostly women, with a specific focus on the ICT sector. She has been very involved in building Ukraine’s digital capacity and IT sector development. Sanna is also interested in helping to build further digital capacities for better governance at both the local and national levels. To achieve this, she is keen on connecting with individuals in California, including local government representatives, who are engaged in similar efforts. She is also eager to connect with women in the Bay Area who have participated in ICT-related retraining and reskilling initiatives.

Gulsanna is interested in technology around elections, blockchain, and security that would be involved in structuring a way in which all displaced Ukrainians might have the opportunity to vote in the next round of presidential and/or parliamentary and local elections. She endeavors to understand the risks and benefits of such a system and, thus, is interested in connecting with experts in technical/computer science who are conversant in blockchain and e-voting, if only to explain why these ideas may not work that well. She is also interested in digital diplomacy, promoting and sharing Ukrainian digital transformation experiences.

Halyna Yanchenko was elected to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) in 2019 and is the Deputy Chair of Sluha Narodum “SN” (Servant of the People), a centrist, pro-European and anti-corruption Party. Shortly after her election, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, tapped her to lead government investment efforts. In January 2022, she was appointed as a Secretary in the National Investment Council of Ukraine. In addition, she chairs the Temporary Special Commission of the Verkhovna Rada on protecting investor rights. Prior to being elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, she led the Civil Oversight Council at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. In 2014-2015 was a deputy of the Kyiv city council. Halyna earned a Master’s Degree in Sociology from the National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. She also studied for one year at Wichita Falls High School in Texas. 

Project Description: Halyna has many interests and was an important voice in the political process that led to the creation of “Diya” (a state cell phone application that has electronic IDs and provides public services to citizens and businesses) to make it easy and secure for Ukrainians to obtain digital drivers’ licenses, passports, health cards, and the like. This was very successful, and Ukrainians can now do all of this on their smartphones. Building on this success, Halyna is interested in using technology to assist in quickly employing veterans and returning displaced Ukrainians post-war. She is interested in engaging foreign investment for the recovery of Ukraine. She also wants to learn more about platforms and systems that can match skills with reconstruction priorities (as well as helping to map out those priorities). She would benefit from making connections in the private sector, including tech companies that could be helpful in these areas, as well as learning more from people who have worked in post-conflict zones on reconstruction priorities and organization. She also seeks to meet with emergency and disaster preparedness and recovery organizations at the state, federal and local levels or other contacts who may have experience in some of these areas.

Konstantyn ("Kostya") Chyzhyk is a Partner at British-Ukrainian law and consultancy firm Hillmont Partners, helping international companies develop business in Ukraine and advising the government and the parliament on economic and judicial reforms. As Deputy Minister of Energy and Ecology, Konstantyn coordinated European integration, investments, digital transformation, and security, worked on renewable energy sector stabilization and reform, launched new auctions on gas extraction, and managed the largest sectoral loan and grant portfolio in the government of $1.2B. As Deputy Head and later as Head of the Investment Promotion Office under the President of Ukraine, Konstantyn unlocked and secured more than $1B of foreign direct investments. As Head of Communications and International Relations of the Ministry of Finance, he promoted IMF-backed reforms and managed cooperation with investors and the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, and EIB. 

Project Description: Kostya wants to use his time at Stanford to develop a new vision for ways in which to attract foreign direct investment to Ukraine. He is interested in learning more about strategic, sectoral, and institutional policy and regulatory frameworks that Ukraine would need to have in place in order to attract foreign capital post-war. He is keen on engaging with professionals from private equity and venture funds. Additionally, he seeks to connect with regional authorities, both at the state and local levels, if applicable, who are actively involved in economic development and the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI). Kostya's intention is to gain insights from California's initiatives in this realm and also understand more about the factors that investors prioritize when considering investment in post-conflict areas.

Mykhailo Pavliuk is vice-chairman of the Chernivtsi Oblast (state) legislature in Ukraine. Among his central duties is the protection of the mutual interests of communities (known in Ukrainian as hromadas) and local governing bodies. His interests have long been focused on Euro-Atlantic integration, decentralization and deconcentration of authority in Ukraine, and the engagement of public and non-governmental organizations in policymaking. As acting Governor of the Chernivtsi Oblast State Administration in 2018-2019, Mykhailo focused on the creation of a successful administrative structure of new, capable, self-sufficient communities. In 2006-2010 shortly after his university graduation, he also organized long-term public discussions about the advantages for Ukraine of European Union and NATO membership. In his spare time, Mykhailo volunteers to deliver humanitarian aid to liberated areas of Ukraine and to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He also supports internally displaced persons in Chernivtsi and coordinates their resettlement.

Project Description: Mykhailo’s project is about local self-governance — its decentralization, finalization, and implementation in the post-war period in Ukraine. He wants to learn more about checks and balances between executive and local self-governance in the United States, how to empower self-sufficient communities (hromadas in Ukrainian, which are literally community-based forms of governance) and enrich them with practices of good governance (transparent, responsive and efficient), and also ways in which to engage citizens in local public issues. During his time at Stanford, he is interested in meeting with local government representatives in Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and Mountain View, as well as state (California) government actors to understand better how (or whether) this works here.

Olena Kutsai is a lawyer with more than 15 years of experience in the international corporate sector, including work for Chevron and Scorpio Real Estate corporations. Olena currently serves as a Member of the Secretariat of the Business Ombudsman Council of Ukraine and is a Member of the Peace Coalition. In the Business Ombudsman Council, Olena leads high-level dialogues focused on improving the business environment in Ukraine. She is responsible for strategic cooperation with a number of stakeholders, including the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. Olena drives several special initiatives to support the reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine following Russia’s invasion in 2022. She also develops policy recommendations promoting good governance, sustainable development, and the rule of law in Ukraine, working with the Government of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada (parliament), the Office of the President of Ukraine, business associations, non-governmental institutions, international financial institutions (World Bank, EBRD), and international development organizations such as USAID and Agriteam. Olena is an author and co-author of the Council’s educational webinars and training for the private and public sectors. She holds a Master’s of Public Administration from the Ukrainian Catholic University and a Master’s of Law from the Eastern European University. Olena is a graduate of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Leadership Academy for Development (Stanford University) and an advanced leadership course at Harvard Business School.

Project Description: Olena has an extensive background in business development and business advocacy. Her primary interest revolves around exploring effective strategies to reconstruct and revitalize the business community in Kherson, a region in southeastern Ukraine liberated from Russian occupation in the spring of 2022. Her overarching goal is to create models that can be scaled, adapted, and implemented in other parts of Ukraine.

Her past work has been focused on helping businesses forced to relocate from occupied or conflict-ridden areas of Ukraine. She helped these businesses secure new operational spaces, access essential services like electricity and internet, and rebuild disrupted supply chains to resume production. In Kherson, specific challenges arise due to the aftermath of flooding caused by the Russian military's destruction of the Khakovka Dam on June 6, 2023. Alongside her focus on business recovery, Olena also seeks to address the cleanup and restoration of vital services like electricity and internet, as well as the rebuilding of other infrastructure destroyed in the flooding.

Given the significant environmental damage in Kherson, Olena has found value in connecting with experts in food sustainability at Stanford, as well as climate and environmental scientists like David Lobell. She also seeks to engage with and learn from individuals with experience in disaster cleanup and recovery, both within California and on a national and international scale.

Amid escalating tensions between the United States and China and as the U.S. government is exploring how to further limit China's access to U.S. technology, discussions about the possibility of decoupling between the two countries have intensified. As businesses operating in China grapple with the potential consequences of decoupling, APARC’s China Program hosted a panel of executives across industries from tech, retail, and finance currently engaged in reshaping their China businesses to provide a view from the ground and consider the future of decoupling with China.

The event was the second installment in a special series celebrating APARC’s 40th anniversary. Titled Asia in 2030, APARC@40, the series highlights core areas of the center’s expertise, examines Asia’s transformation over the past four decades, and considers the drivers and shapers of the region’s future.

The panel featured Dan Brody, the managing director of Tencent Investments, who is responsible for the company’s overseas investments; Frits Van Paasschen, a change management expert, former CEO of Starwood Hotels and Resorts, and former president of EMEA at Nike; and Stuart Schonberger, a founding partner of CDH Investments, one of the leading China-focused alternative asset managers. China Program Director Jean Oi chaired the panel.

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Risks and Opportunities

Van Paasschen described his extensive experience developing strategies for expanding licensing and retail in China, which involved navigating the country's infrastructure and legal framework and, as CEO of Starwood Hotels, overseeing the construction of over 100 hotels. He ascribed his success in the country to his recognition of China’s strengths and weaknesses and his finding ways to interact positively with Chinese stakeholders.

The term decoupling is an oversimplification of the relationship between the complex Chinese and U.S. economies, said Van Paasschen. He noted that retailers in many cases are looking to sources from alternative markets to China, but that he believes there are still opportunities for investment in and co-development with China that remain unaffected by current frictions. He highlighted in this context the interplay between the U.S. and Chinese travel and tourism industries before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Schonberger, who also challenged the notion of decoupling as a misleading shorthand, emphasized the need for cognitive empathy between the world’s two great powers and understanding the motivation behind China's actions. He noted that the challenges facing China today are complex, including debt problems, real estate slowdown, and productivity stagnation, but said these are "known knowns" that the Chinese government is actively working to correct.

Schonberger sees two distinct issues facing institutional equity investors worried about China: government policies that negatively affect growth and corporate prospects, and longer-term risks arising from China's geopolitical position. For private investors who are focused on total return and can tolerate overt political pressures, China remains investable, as Chinese stocks have been some of the best performers on the public markets recently, said Schonberger. The challenges are greater, however, for public entities and bond investors who are more affected by political risk in their decisions. While the risks are higher, Schonberger's firm continues to invest in Chinese companies in multiple sectors.

Changes Underway

Brody said that China remains a key player in the global economy. As a personal anecdote, he noted that, while he makes fewer trips to the United States, he is traveling more frequently to Europe, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia. According to Brody, the extent to which the Chinese economy would be affected by international fluctuations is unclear, but he expects the country to continue its economic growth and attract foreign investors. He stated that a huge amount of value in the tech sector is still being created in America, so economically driven foreign investors in the tech sector still pay close attention to developments in Silicon Valley.

Van Paasschen, by contrast, pointed out that by decoupling with China, the United States would miss out on a generational opportunity for development and could potentially lose out to other countries. China still presents an enormous opportunity for businesses, he said, particularly in the hotel industry, given the country’s rate of urbanization. He reminded the audience that every country and region presents its own set of challenges and risks for investors. The imperative is to ensure Beijing and Washington maintain a dialogue and businesses are willing to take risks to invest in China.

Van Paasschen went on to describe how the U.S.-China political tensions are affecting business operations in various sectors. For instance, in the biotechnology sector, companies might consider protecting intellectual property and ensuring sustainability in their supply chain. In the apparel business, there is a growing concern about human rights and the opacity of the cotton supply chain. Overall, Van Paasschen sees a transition underway from a bilateral and straightforward approach to trade to a much more nuanced and complicated approach.

When asked if political tensions would affect some sectors more than others, Van Paasschen responded affirmatively. He gave the example of a sovereign wealth fund that refused to support investments in Chinese hotels because of the uncertainty zero-COVID policies had created. He also said that further uncertainty could arise from countries' reactions to China’s foreign policy stance, such as China's support of Russia in Ukraine.

What advice would the three business experts give Washington?

Van Paasschen expressed his hope the United States finds ways to avoid being reactive. Schonberger, urging policymakers to keep working towards peaceful coexistence, emphasized it would be counter-productive to frame China as an enemy. He also highlighted the importance of redundancy and efficiency in trade relationships and cautioned against overlooking the cost of decoupling, reminding the audience that engagement with China has boosted global trade, lifted millions out of poverty, and created a vibrant society.

From Brody’s perspective, predictability is crucial for business, regardless of the country one is conducting business in. He also stressed that, from a personal perspective and regardless of one’s political stance on China, the reduction in people-to-people ties between China and the United States due to recent travel restrictions is unfortunate. Ultimately, these ties have always been a net positive, and it is important to recognize their value even in the midst of tensions between the two nations. While political leaders may grapple with complex geopolitical issues, the connections between ordinary citizens remain a vital foundation for maintaining a constructive relationship. By fostering personal exchanges, the United States and China can build bridges and promote mutual understanding, even in the face of challenging circumstances.

A New Reality

In his opening remarks, McFaul asked the panelists to share their mood as they enter the second year of the war. Ustinova said that just prior to the panel event, they’d been informed of an impending Russian attack.

“There is a very high probability that today, Kyiv and other cities will be shelled pretty heavily,” she said, adding that despite the threat, they weren’t going anywhere and that the parliament was still in session.

“That’s the mood of Ukrainians,” she said. “We know we can be hit any day, we can die any day, but this is the reality we have to live in.”

Honcharuk said he’d heard the opinion that authoritarian regimes are better suited for war because they are more mobile and less distracted by politics, thus creating the impression that democracies are indecisive. But, he said, Ukraine’s war effort demonstrates the opposite.

“I feel proud that Ukraine now denied this and showed the power of democracy,” he said.

When an audience member asked how the war has impacted political life in Ukraine, Honcharuk said there are challenges. For example, there are some conflicts between the central and local governments, but they don’t appear to be systemic problems. He said the parliament is still working and all Ukrainian political parties are “more or less united.” He also noted that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has “huge support” from the Ukrainian people.

Aid and Allies

Since the start of the war, the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars on aid to Ukraine, including artillery, tanks, and rocket launchers. The support has not only helped Ukraine stave off defeat, but enabled their success in many battles against Putin’s army.

In a recent interview with Stanford News, Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and an affiliate at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), said that Ukraine’s military had considerable success in the last four months of 2022, pushing Russian forces out of the Kharkiv region and back across the Dnipro River in Kherson.

On Friday, the panelists expressed gratitude for the support of the United States and other western allies in aiding their victories on the battlefield.

“Thank you,” Matviichuk said. “Ukraine and Ukrainians will always remember how American people support us in [these] dramatic times.”

Honcharuk agreed and said he viewed the U.S. as a partner in the war. “I want American people to understand that now we are together – Ukraine on the frontline, you on the back,” he said.

The panelists also urged for continued cooperation from Western allies.

“The prescription for war is three [items],” Leshchenko said. “First is weapons, second is sanctions [on Russia], third is financial support.”
 

Looking Ahead

The group expressed hope that this year Ukraine will see a victorious end to the war. Leshchenko added that he would like to someday see Ukraine join the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) because it could make significant contributions to the alliance.

“I think the Ukrainian army [is] going to be the best army in Europe,” he said. “It would be a privilege for NATO to have the Ukrainian army’s support because it will defend Europe much better than Europe has [been] able to do with its own army.”

Ustinova said a common misunderstanding about the war is that it started last year with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But the conflict, she said, dates back to 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, and she explained how Ukrainians define success.

“Our victory is the total liberalization of each kilometer of the captured territories since 2014. Not since 2022,” she said.

She added that what’s most important to understand about the war is that it has broad implications, including for the West.

“We all have to realize, this is not a Ukrainian war,” she said. “If the West loses in Ukraine, it will be a total collapse for the rest of the world.”

This opinion article first appeared in the Washington Post.

Most world leaders, including President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, agree that the defense of Taiwan is crucial for regional security. But most options for improving deterrence will take too long. Building Taiwan’s self-defense, developing more U.S. firepower in the region, creating the economic resilience to make severe sanctions feasible: None of these will come to fruition before 2030.

Japan could change the game now. Allied forces, responding immediately and en masse, have a chance of thwarting a Chinese invasion, according to a recent report from the Center for Strategic & International Studies. But, in meetings with high-level officials in Tokyo last month, I sensed a mismatch between talk and walk. Japan must broaden its vision of self-defense to encompass priorities and declaratory policies that will avert calamity in the region. Tokyo cannot wait until war breaks out to start the tougher conversations.

Here’s why.

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First, without Japan, the United States could be outgunned in a fight to defend Taiwan, notwithstanding Washington’s new basing agreement with the Philippines. A combined U.S.-Japan fleet, on the other hand, would boast more than three times as many aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers as the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The quality of many Japanese ships approaches that of its U.S. counterparts. Eight of Japan’s destroyers field a state-of-the-art Aegis weapons system used by some of the more advanced ships in the U.S. Navy.

Second, Japan’s involvement could mitigate some of the geographic vulnerabilities of the United States. Adding Japanese bases more than doubles the locations from which the two countries together could conduct operations. Japan’s southwestern islands are closer to Taiwan than mainland China. Take Yonaguni Island, just about 70 miles from Taiwan’s east coast. On it are intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, as well as anti-ship and anti-aircraft capabilities. Operating from these bases in the defense of Taiwan, allied forces would have more opportunities to quickly target an invading force. That would make attacks on U.S. bases in Japan, such as Kadena, at the southernmost tip of the archipelago, less attractive to the Chinese. Such strikes would no longer completely cripple an air effort.

Third, Japan has military strengths that would make a fait accompli almost impossible for China. Though Japanese diesel submarines are slower than U.S. counterparts, they could reach the Taiwan Strait in just two days. U.S. submarines departing from Hawaii would take at least a week; from San Diego even longer. This makes Japan the first line of defense for Taiwan. Japanese boats could also monitor key choke points through which Chinese navy submarines would be attempting to exit the First Island Chain in the western Pacific. This would free up the quieter submarines of the U.S. Navy to wreak havoc on amphibious vessels and escort ships.

In short, Tokyo could contribute significantly to a military effort to deny China the ability to take Taiwan by force. To do so, Japan must increase its stockpile of torpedoes and long-range strike weapons, as planned. Tokyo must be willing to go after the amphibious invasion force and targets on mainland China — a very controversial proposition indeed.

On the surface, it looks as if Japan is moving in the right direction. The government took the groundbreaking historic step of increasing defense spending to 2 percent of Japan’s gross domestic product over the next five years. This meant a whopping 26.3 percent increase in 2023 alone. The greatest increase in the past was in 1986, by nearly 50 percent.

Last year, former prime minister Shinzo Abe stated that the security of Japan is connected to Taiwan. He said a Chinese use of force against a U.S. vessel defending Taiwan could legally trigger the deployment of Japan’s military (known as the Self-Defense Force).

Indeed, a 2015 law allows Japan to engage in collective defense when presented with an existential threat. This provides plenty of flexibility for Japan to fight alongside the United States without the need for a constitutional amendment. The officials I spoke with in Tokyo were firm that Japan would respond if China attacked U.S. bases such as Kadena.

But all these initiatives concern self-defense. Japan does worry that military activity around Taiwan could extend to the security of its southwestern islands. Or that if China takes Taiwan, it would be emboldened to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which Tokyo administers but which China also claims. There are even concerns that Okinawa, a group of 160-plus islands that is home to 1.4 million people (and dozens of U.S. bases), could then prove enticing to Beijing.

Crudely, Japan seems to be prepared to push back against only Chinese assets that are clearly poised to attack its sovereign territory. Those heading toward Taiwan? Not so much.

While a degree of strategic ambiguity makes sense, too much could backfire. If Japan is clearly unwilling to defend Taiwan, then improvements in Japanese military capabilities will do little to deter conflict across the strait. Japanese officials don’t need to say they would attack any Chinese invading forces, but they need to let their counterparts know it is a real possibility. The officials I met were unwilling to send such strong messages; some insisted reassuring Beijing was more important.

Tokyo must make clear at home and abroad that defending Taiwan is no longer off the table. The prospect of Japan engaging in offensive operations in the defense of Taiwan would stay Chinese President Xi Jinping’s hand. Only then would recent monumental changes in Japanese politics fulfill their potential in contributing to peace and security in Asia. If Ukraine has taught us anything, it is that deterrence is costly, but war is worse.

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Military Miscalculations, Economic Dislocations

McFaul opened the first session by reviewing some of the lessons from the war in Ukraine. The international community underestimated the Ukrainian military, he said. Putin, however, miscalculated the response of the United States and NATO, on the military side, and the scope of the sanctions the global community of democratic states, including Japan, would be willing to impose on Russia, on the economic side. 

It turned out, noted McFaul, that it was possible to reduce drastically Russian oil and gas coming into Europe, and Russia today has significantly fewer resources to fight Ukraine than it had anticipated. “I think it is very important to look at just how much economic dislocation happened with Russia, a country that was not integrated into the global economic world in the same way that China is,” McFaul said. He pointed out that the international community might also be underestimating the political pressure and dislocation that will erupt if, unprovoked, China invades Taiwan. “It will have very deep economic consequences for the Chinese economy,” said McFaul.

It is important to remember that the international community did not make credible commitments to deterring Russia before 2022, McFaul noted. In the case of China, he emphasized the imperative of considering concrete ways to enhance deterrence against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before military action begins. 

Rethinking Defense and Deterrence

China, however, is not easily deterrable, as Mastro explained in her following remarks. President Xi has been clear from early on that enhancing China’s role on the international stage would be a key part of the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda. Taiwan is a top priority issue in the Chinese Communist Party’s long-term thinking, said Mastro. She reminded the audience that at the recent CCP Congress, President Xi reaffirmed that China will not rule out using force to bring Taiwan under its control. He also elevated Party members with extensive expertise in the joint operational domain and with Taiwan contingencies to the Central Military Commission, the Chinese top decision-making body for military affairs.

How, then should the United States and its allies approach the question of deterring China? Mastro emphasized three conditions that U.S and Japanese defense policy must meet.

First, whatever the United States and Japan do in the defense realm must have an operational impact. For example, U.S. carriers will do nothing to prevent China from taking Taiwan in a wartime scenario, Mastro argued. “And along those lines, from the Japanese point of view, enhancing defense of the Senkaku Islands does nothing to deter China from taking Taiwan unless Japanese operations are going to be involved directly in stopping a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.”

The second condition is that China has to know about any defense changes the U.S. and its allies are making. For instance, if, in peacetime, there is no indication that the Japanese military is engaging in Taiwan Strait transits with the United States and the Chinese do not know about such activities, then they do not enhance deterrence.

Third, deterrence must happen before a war starts. It may seem an obvious point, but if the prevalent view is that, for example, the Japanese public will support the United States once a conflict over Taiwan erupts, then this approach does not deter China. “We have to let the Chinese know now that there is such support,” Mastro stated.

One issue China is concerned about, Mastro noted, is widening a Taiwan contingency. “China only wins Taiwan if the war is short, geographically limited to Taiwan, and only involves the United States, potentially in Taiwan,” she explained. “So I am convinced that if Japan were to commit to fighting with the United States in this contingency, that would be enough to deter China.”

Ultimately, the question before the United States and its allies is: “Do we want a happy China that is undeterred or an unhappy China that's deterred,” Mastro concluded. “Those are our only two options.” Deterrence is expensive and requires tradeoffs, but one thing that is costlier than deterrence is a major war, she emphasized.

“Let’s start thinking about how to actually change the environment with the sense of urgency that we need, because my biggest fear is that we're going to find ourselves in a major war with massive cost,” she urged the audience. There will be sacrifices to make, but the alternative, in Mastro's view, is worse.

Opportunities and Perils for Democracy

In the second session of the conference, panelists Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama examined the war in Ukraine and the tensions over Taiwan from the lens of democratic decline and its implications for the liberal international order.

Democracy has been in a global recession for most of the last two decades, yet the picture is not as bleak for democracies as it was just two or three years ago, said Diamond. In the United States, reforms at the state level have occurred, election deniers took control of Congress seats by a much smaller margin than predicted before the 2022 midterms, and extreme election deniers in crucial swing states were virtually defeated. Meanwhile, on the international stage, 2022 spotlighted autocrats’ inevitable shortcomings. In Russia, Putin has catastrophically miscalculated the war in Ukraine. In China, Xi has massively mismanaged the COVID pandemic, and the country’s economic growth is severely impaired.

Fukuyama said he was encouraged by the democratic solidarity shown in response to the war in Ukraine, especially in Europe, within NATO, and in Japan. Germany’s and Japan’s decisions to increase their defense budgets have been remarkably reassuring signals of strength among democracies, he noted.

But we sometimes forget that many countries in the Global South and elsewhere do not buy into this narrative, cautioned Fukuyama. Among the big disappointments in this regard is India, he stated, which raises the question of whether the issue at stake is indeed a battle between democracy and authoritarianism.

Indeed, democracies still face intractable challenges, Diamond explained. These include the corrupting influence of dirty money around the world, the trends of de-industrialization and hollowing out of the working class in advanced democracies, and social media, which Diamond sees as the single biggest driver of democratic decline. “I cannot tell you how much damage social media has done to destroy the social fabric of Truth and credibility and polarize society into tribal camps who don't have the same facts,” he said. “We have not found a way to temper that impact and win the battle For Truth.”

Taiwan and Deterrence

When it comes to the question of Taiwan, Diamond says he is worried. “There is going to be a PRC military invasion of Taiwan, probably in this decade, unless it is deterred,” he said. The three most crucial actors in deterring China are Taiwan, the United States, and Japan, he explained. Successful deterrence must involve coordination among all three in multiple arenas — from military cooperation to increased defense capacity and preparedness to impose such heavy costs in response to a Chinese invading force that will change Xi’s calculus.

Diamond observed that democracy is about uncertainty, of which there is now plenty in Taiwan as it looks ahead to a January 2024 contentious presidential election. Diamond’s prediction is that "China will intervene however it thinks it can” in Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election, as Xi would certainly prefer to pick up the island peacefully than by force, he said. “I think it's going to be very important that the people of Taiwan see that they're not alone, that the democracies of the world — not just the United States and Japan but Australia and Europe — are with them; it will increase their will to fight.”