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This systematic review examines what factors explain the diversity of findings regarding hospital ownership and quality. We identified 31 observational studies written in English since 1990 that used multivariate analysis to examine quality of care at nonfederal general acute, short-stay US hospitals. We find that pooled estimates of ownership effects are sensitive to the subset of studies included and the extent of overlap among hospitals analyzed in the underlying studies. Ownership does appear to be systematically related to differences in quality among hospitals in several contexts. Whether studies find for-profit and government-controlled hospitals to have higher mortality rates or rates of adverse events than their nonprofit counterparts depends on data sources, time period, and region covered. Policymakers should be aware of the underlying reasons for conflicting evidence in this literature, and the strengths and weaknesses of meta-analytic synthesis. The "true" effect of ownership appears to depend on institutional context, including differences across regions, markets, and over time.

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Health Economics
Authors
Karen Eggleston
Karen Eggleston
Yu-Chu Shen
Joseph Lau
Christopher H. Schmid
Jia Chan
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OBJECTIVES: The purposes of this study were to develop a pediatric-focused tool for adverse drug event detection and describe the incidence and characteristics of adverse drug events in children's hospitals identified by this tool.

METHODS: A pediatric-specific trigger tool for adverse drug event detection was developed and tested. Eighty patients from each site were randomly selected for retrospective chart review. All adverse drug events identified using the trigger tool were evaluated for severity, preventability, ability to mitigate, ability to identify the event earlier, and presence of associated occurrence report. Each trigger and the entire tool were evaluated for positive predictive value.

RESULTS: Review of 960 randomly selected charts from 12 children's hospitals revealed 2388 triggers (2.49 per patient) and 107 unique adverse drug events. Mean adverse drug event rates were 11.1 per 100 patients, 15.7 per 1000 patient-days, and 1.23 per 1000 medication doses. The positive predictive value of the trigger tool was 3.7%. Twenty-two percent of all adverse drug events were deemed preventable, 17.8% could have been identified earlier, and 16.8% could have been mitigated more effectively. Ninety-seven percent of the identified adverse drug events resulted in mild, temporary harm. Only 3.7% of adverse drug events were identified in existing hospital-based occurrence reports. The most common adverse drug events identified were pruritis and nausea, the most common medication classes causing adverse drug events were opioid analgesics and antibiotics, and the most common stages of the medication management process associated with preventable adverse drug events were monitoring and prescribing/ordering.

CONCLUSIONS: Adverse drug event rates in hospitalized children are substantially higher than previously described. Most adverse drug events resulted in temporary harm, and 22% were classified as preventable. Only 3.7% were identified by using traditional voluntary reporting methods. Our pediatric-focused trigger tool is effective at identifying adverse drug events in inpatient pediatric populations.

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Journal Articles
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Pediatrics
Authors
Takata G
Mason W
Takatoma C
Logsdon T
Paul Sharek
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OBJECTIVES: Narcotic-related adverse drug events are the most common adverse drug events in hospitalized children. Despite multiple published studies describing interventions that decrease adverse drug events from narcotics, large-scale collaborative quality improvement efforts to address narcotic-related adverse drug events in pediatrics have not been described. The purpose of this study was to evaluate collaborative-wide narcotic-related adverse drug event rates after a collection of expert panel-defined best practices was implemented.

METHODS: All 42 children's hospitals in the Child Health Corporation of America were invited to participate in the Institute for Healthcare Improvement-style quality improvement collaborative aimed at reducing narcotic-related adverse drug events. A collection of interventions known or suspected to reduce narcotic-related adverse drug events was recommended by an expert panel, with each site implementing >or=1 of these best practices on the basis of local need. Narcotic-related adverse drug event rates were compared between the baseline (December 1, 2004, to March 31, 2005) and postimplementation periods (January 1, 2006, to March 31, 2006) after an a priori-defined intervention ramp-up time (April 1, 2005, and December 31, 2005). Secondary outcome measures included constipation rates and narcotic-related automated drug-dispensing-device override percentages.

RESULTS: Median narcotic-related adverse drug event rates decreased 67% between the baseline and postimplementation time frames across the 14-site collaborative. Constipation rates decreased 68.9%, and automated drug-dispensing-device overrides decreased from 10.18% to 5.91% of all narcotic doses administered.

CONCLUSIONS: Implementation of >or=1 expert panel-recommended interventions at each participating site resulted in a significant decrease in narcotic-related adverse drug events, constipation, and automated drug-dispensing-device overrides in a 12-month, 14-site children's hospital quality collaborative.

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Pediatrics
Authors
Paul J. Sharek
McClead RE
Taketomo C
Luria JW
Takata GS
Walti B
Tanski M
Carla N
Logsdon TR
Thurm C
Federico F
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BACKGROUND: Strengthening hospital safety culture offers promise for reducing adverse events, but efforts to improve culture may not succeed if hospital managers perceive safety differently from frontline workers.

OBJECTIVES: To determine whether frontline workers and supervisors perceive a more negative patient safety climate (ie, surface features, reflective of the underlying safety culture) than senior managers in their institutions. To ascertain patterns of variation within management levels by professional discipline.

RESEARCH DESIGN: A safety climate survey was administered from March 2004 to May 2005 in 92 US hospitals. Individual-level cross sectional comparisons related safety climate to management level. Hierarchical and hospital-fixed effects modeling tested differences in perceptions.

SUBJECTS: Random sample of hospital personnel (18,361 respondents).

MEASURES: Frequency of responses indicating absence of safety climate (percent problematic response) overall and for 8 survey dimensions.

RESULTS: Frontline workers' safety climate perceptions were 4.8 percentage points (1.4 times) more problematic than were senior managers', and supervisors' perceptions were 3.1 percentage points (1.25 times) more problematic than were senior managers'. Differences were consistent among 7 safety climate dimensions. Differences by management level depended on discipline: senior manager versus frontline worker discrepancies were less pronounced for physicians and more pronounced for nurses, than they were for other disciplines.

CONCLUSIONS: Senior managers perceived patient safety climate more positively than nonsenior managers overall and across 7 discrete safety climate domains. Patterns of variation by management level differed by professional discipline. Continuing efforts to improve patient safety should address perceptual differences, both among and within groups by management level.

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Medical Care
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Sara J. Singer
Sara J. Singer
Alyson Falwell
Laurence C. Baker
Laurence C. Baker
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OBJECTIVE: To contrast the safety-related concerns raised by front-line staff about hospital work systems (operational failures) with national patient safety initiatives.

DATA SOURCES: Primary data included 1,732 staff-identified operational failures at 20 U.S. hospitals from 2004 to 2006.

STUDY DESIGN: Senior managers observed front-line staff and facilitated open discussion meetings with employees about their patient safety concerns.

DATA COLLECTION: Hospitals submitted data on the operational failures identified through managers' interactions with front-line workers. Data were analyzed for type of failure and frequency of occurrence. Recommendations from staff were compared with recommendations from national initiatives.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The two most frequent categories of operational failures, equipment/supplies and facility issues, posed safety risks and diminished staff efficiency, but have not been priorities in national initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS: Our study suggests an underutilized strategy for improving patient safety and staff efficiency: leveraging front-line staff experiences with work systems to identify and address operational failures. In contrast to the perceived tradeoff between safety and efficiency, fixing operational failures can yield benefits for both. Thus, prioritizing improvement of work systems in general, rather than focusing more narrowly on specific clinical conditions, can increase safety and efficiency of hospitals.

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Health Services Research
Authors
Anita Tucker
Sara J. Singer
Sara J. Singer
Jennifer Hayes
Alyson Falwell
Authors
Karen Eggleston
Karen Eggleston
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Clear evidence suggests the importance of health service provider payment incentives for achieving efficiency, equal access, and quality, including attention to primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. “Pay for performance” may be on the cusp of significant expansion in Asia, and reform away from fee-for-service has been underway for several years in several economies. Yet despite the policy relevance, the evidence base for evaluating payment reforms in Asia is still very limited.

China in particular has been undertaking significant reforms to its health care system in both rural and urban areas. With the expansion of insurance coverage and need to resolve incentive problems like “supporting medical care through drug sales,” there is an urgent need for evaluating alternative ways of paying health service providers. Evidence from policy reforms in specific regions of China, as well as other economies of the Asia-Pacific, can provide valuable evidence to help inform policy decisions about how to align provider incentives with policy goals of quality care at reasonable cost.

To illuminate these questions, the Asia Health Policy Program and several collaborating institutions are planning to convene a conference on health care provider payment incentives on November 7-8, 2008 in Beijing. The conference will highlight and seek to distill “best-practice” lessons from rigorous and policy-relevant evaluations of recent reforms in China and elsewhere in the Asia Pacific.

The organizing committee – including health economists from Shorenstein APARC, Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Seoul National University – reviewed submissions in June 2008 and accepted sixteen. The conference papers cover payment issues in Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, Thailand, Tajikistan, the Philippines, and the US, and the disciplines of economics, health services research/health policy, public health, medicine, and ethics. Topics include institutionalized informal payments; the impact of global budget policies on high-cost patients; public-private partnerships; public-sector physicians owning private pharmacies; evidence-informed case payment rates; payment and hospital quality; bonuses and physician satisfaction; physician prescription choice between brand-name and generic drugs; and differences in pharmaceutical utilization across insurance plans that pay providers differently (fee-for-service versus capitation).

Policymakers from China’s National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Health will also speak at the conference. Selected research papers will be published through the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center either in a special volume or in a special issue of an English-language health policy journal.

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Contradictory goals plague China’s pharmaceutical policy. The government wants to develop the domestic pharmaceutical industry and has used drug pricing to cross-subsidize public hospitals. Yet the government also aims to control pharmaceutical spending through price caps and profit-margin regulations to guarantee access even for poor patients. The resulting system has distorted market incentives, increased consumer cost, and financially rewarded inappropriate prescribing, thus undermining public health. Though pharmaceuticals account for about half of total healthcare expenditures in China, representing 43% of expenditure per inpatient episode and 51% of expenditure per outpatient visit, some essential medicines are unavailable or of questionable quality.

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Health Affairs
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Qiang SUN
Michael A. Santoro
Qingyue MENG
Caitlin Liu
Karen Eggleston
Karen Eggleston
Authors
Judith K. Paulus
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On May 1, 2003, President Bush publicly declared an end to combat in Iraq. Four years later, the conflict had only intensified, fueled by a violent insurgency, sectarian strife, and a resurgent al-Qaeda in Iraq. More than 3,000 American servicemen and servicewomen had been killed and 790,000 Iraqi civilians were dead. What had gone so disastrously wrong? Charles Ferguson, an MIT-trained political scientist, determined to find out.

Drawing on shockingly frank interviews with U.S. government officials, military personnel, diplomats, journalists and Iraqi leaders and citizens, his first film, No End in Sight: The American Occupation of Iraq, examines comprehensively how the Bush administration constructed the Iraq war and subsequent occupation. The film won the Special Jury Prize, documentary competition, at the 2007 Sundance Film Festival, as a “timely work that clearly illuminates the misguided policy decisions that have led to the catastrophic quagmire of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.”

“Overnight rendered unemployed and infuriated are 500,000 armed men,” one of many ill-advised moves that ignited resentment, desperation, and a still-raging insurgency.On May 23, the Freeman Spogli Institute hosted a special screening of the film, followed by a distinguished panel of experts. Among the film’s central themes was the failure to commit sufficient troops to maintain order, secure the borders, or protect government ministries, historic sites, or ammunition depots. The destruction of national treasures, depicted vividly, was heartbreaking.

Soon after one watershed—the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the defeat of the military—there was another watershed, characterized by widespread looting, lawlessness, and a growing feeling among Iraqis that Americans could not protect them. The film chronicles three especially fateful decisions: to halt the formation of an Iraqi interim government (as Iraqi opposition leaders felt they had been promised) and impose an American occupation instead; a wide-ranging campaign of de-Baathification—the purging of higher-level Baath Party officials who ran the civil service and even staffed many schools and hospitals; and the hasty decision to disband the Iraqi military and intelligence services.

Said Col. Paul Hughes (Ret.), “We could have used Iraqi units to clean up, build roads, and rebuild their country.” Instead, the military were told they were going to be out of work, leaving millions of Iraqis suddenly without support. The film recounts, “Overnight rendered unemployed and infuriated are 500,000 armed men,” one of many ill-advised moves that ignited resentment, desperation, and a still-raging insurgency. Ambassador Barbara Bodine recalled, “When we were first starting the reconstruction, we used to joke that there were 500 ways to do it wrong and two to three ways to do it right. What we didn’t understand is that we were going to go through all 500.”

The riveting documentary was followed by a lively panel discussion among Stanford political scientists, historians, and experts on the war in Iraq. Moderating the panel was Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow and coordinator of the Democracy Program at FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, who called the war “one of the greatest policy tragedies in American history.” Diamond served as an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority and wrote a book about the experience, titled %publication1%.

Writer and director Charles Ferguson noted that the shooting to inclusion ratio was 100:1 and said he will release more than 100 hours of film and 3,000 pages of transcripts as a public archive for the historical record. Col. Christopher Gibson, a 2006–07 National Security Affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution, who served in both the Gulf and Iraq wars, observed in his opening remarks, “For this to work in a republic, soldiers have to be there to take the tough questions.” Drawing on his experience during two tours of duty supervising national elections, he underscored the Iraqi people’s desire for freedom and “their deep and sincere desire for democracy.”

David Kennedy, Stanford’s Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History and a 2000 Pulitzer-Prize winner, commended the film for making an important contribution to the historical record. Future historians will have to consider a number of major questions, Kennedy said, including these two: “What was the deep strategic rationale for this war and how was that rationale related to the declared reasons for going to war,” namely the now discredited claims that the regime possessed weapons of mass destruction and had verifiable links to al-Qaeda.

In a lively discussion among panelists, it was agreed that the calculus was complex and many factors converged—an Iraq believed both to be a menace and weakened by many years of sanctions under a brutal leader; a son wishing to redress the policy of the father and avenge a near assassination attempt. But the ideological factor was significant—the belief that we had the ability to effect political change in a country that would transform the character of an entire region.

The debate addressed other critical issues—could the outcome have been better had policy been better informed and more skillfully implemented? Could anything change the outcome now? Said Diamond, the only thing that could materially change the outcome now “would be to combine a military surge with a diplomatic surge,” involving the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and a cooperative Iraqi leadership. The United States should let Iraq know we’ll leave, he stated, if Iraqi leaders fail to undertake the requisite political reconciliation and compromise. As the lively debate and discussion with more than 300 audience members ended, there was little doubt that all these questions would be debated for some time to come.

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For the well-insured, obtaining health care in the United States is like dining in a sumptuous restaurant that has menus without prices. A price-free menu encourages diners to ignore cost when making their selections. Similarly, well-insured patients usually don't know the prices of medical services at the time they receive them. Even for common procedures, few hospitals list their charges, much less the accompanying professional fees and the out-of-pocket costs; these are only revealed weeks or months later, when the explanation of benefits statement arrives. Without prices, motivated patients cannot "shop around" for lower-cost providers of care—and even patients who knew the price could not easily learn whether the care represents good value.

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Annals of Internal Medicine
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Alan M. Garber
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Lisa A. Trei
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At an April 11 symposium in Washington, D.C., Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said while the best-laid plans are likely to change if a pandemic or bioterrorism attack hits the United States, having no plans in place is a sure guarantee for disaster. CISAC members Lynn Eden, Martha Crenshaw, and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar participated in "Germ Warfare, Contagious Disease and the Constitution," a daylong event co-hosted by Stanford Law School. CISAC affiliate Laura K. Donohue conceived and developed the project, which aimed to bring together senior policy-makers and legal experts to discuss how issues of constitutional law inform responses to natural pandemics or bioterrorism attacks.

Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security delivered the keynote address April 11 at the panel titled “Germ Warfare, Contagious Disease and the Constitution” in Washington, D.C.

Although the best-laid plans are likely to change if a pandemic or bioterrorism attack hits the United States, having no plans in place is a sure guarantee for disaster, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told policy-makers, government officials, constitutional law experts and law students at a symposium April 11 in Washington, D.C.

"Preparation won't eliminate the problems and the stress, and it is often said that no battle plan has ever survived first contact with the enemy," Chertoff told the roughly 200 people attending the event, "Germ Warfare, Contagious Disease and the Constitution," hosted by Stanford Law School and the Constitution Project, a nonprofit organization.

"But I can tell you this," Chertoff continued. "If you don't have a plan, you are definitely going to have the worst-case outcome. A plan at least gives you a running start."

During the symposium, experts discussed the need to reform the complex web of federal and state laws to enable agencies to respond effectively to deadly natural or manmade epidemics—from pandemic flu to smallpox and aerosolized anthrax—while protecting individual rights.

Earlier that day, about 60 people from the current and two previous presidential administrations, public health officials, Stanford academics and law students participated in a closed-door, fictitious scenario that explored the federal government's response to an unfolding deadly epidemic as it crossed state lines. Lynn Eden, associate director for research at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, moderated the session, which was developed in cooperation with experts from the Department of Homeland Security.

"I think it's the first time detailed issues of constitutional law have been brought to bear in a natural pandemic or bioterrorism exercise," Eden said afterward. "It's very hard to plan for a catastrophe. This approach brought another facet to bear on disaster planning."

Margaret Hamburg, a former assistant secretary in the Department of Health and Human Services, opened the symposium, which was broadcast live on C-SPAN from the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Kathleen Sullivan, director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, moderated a panel featuring Stanford law Professors Pamela Karlan and Robert Weisberg; Christopher Chyba, director of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and a former CISAC co-director; Jeff Runge, assistant secretary in the Department of Homeland Security; Michael Greenberger, director of the Center for Health and Human Security at the University of Maryland; and Martin Cetron, director of the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Sullivan opened the panel by reflecting on how recent health crises have informed ongoing legal and policy debates: "West Nile virus. Anthrax mailings. Avian flu—responses to these infectious disease issues and concern about bioterrorism are running about our minds as we think about the response to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, and the complex web of local, state and federal authority to deal with such emergencies. What does the Constitution have to say about our ability to deal with infectious disease, whether it's naturally occurring or composed as a weapon of violence?"

In the 21st century, Cetron explained, health officials still rely on a "14th-century toolbox of isolation and quarantine" to control an outbreak. That is "part of our modern reality," he said. "The biggest area is not lack of specific authority, but the fact that jurisdictions are highly complex when it comes to international ports of entry [and] interstate movement. There are often overlapping jurisdictions and overlapping authorities. If there's a gap in some of this, the risk is that neither the state nor the feds would want to step up to that responsibility."

Greenberger said state officials are often ignorant about what they can do in an emergency. "The powers given to governors are extraordinary," he said. Three statutes exist in Maryland to authorize declarations of emergency and allow the governor to enforce isolation and quarantine of infected people, order citizens to take treatment against their will, force doctors to serve in dangerous situations and seize hospitals. "What's extraordinary is that most governors don't even know they have this power," Greenberger said. "The extent of legal illiteracy in this area is shocking."

Despite such challenges, Chertoff praised the participants for tackling the issue. "I think for the first time we've begun to think very seriously and in a disciplined fashion about how to plan for dealing with a major natural pandemic or a major biological attack," he said. "I wish I could tell you these things are unthinkable. But the one thing I've learned in the last seven years is there's pretty much nothing that's unthinkable."

Stanford in Washington

Laura K. Donohue, a CISAC affiliate and a 2007 Stanford Law School graduate who is the inaugural fellow at the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, conceived the daylong event to bring together policy-makers and constitutional experts to discuss response to natural pandemics and bioterrorism. "It was a chance to bring together the policy world, both operational and strategic, and give them the opportunity to talk to legal experts," she said. "This helped policy-makers think through the issues and think outside the box, and it did so in a non-threatening manner."

Donohue said she was prompted to create the symposium after directing a CISAC-supported terrorism-response exercise in 2003 that involved more than 25 agencies at the national, state and local levels. "In these exercises involving first responders, legal issues always got pushed off the table," Donohue said. "I was struck by this. In an emergency, the law goes out the window. Then, when I got to law school, I saw the broader legal and constitutional context for this discussion."

With support from the directors at CISAC and Stanford Law School, and funding from donor Peter Bing and the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, Donohue brought the two groups together in a high-profile setting.

"This was Stanford in Washington," she said. "It was an opportunity for Stanford to be visible at the U.S. Senate with participation from leading people on these issues. There is no doubt we got an audience we wouldn't otherwise have attracted."

This article first appeared in Stanford Report, 4/16/2008.

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