As the third year of Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is now well underway, military victories and defeats in Ukraine’s counter-offensives have served as a primary lens through which Western audiences have understood Russia’s will to continue prosecuting its illegal war. As the Kremlin’s blatant power grab offended the consciences of millions the world over, a means for the West to compel an end to Putin’s war besides military intervention proved necessary. Within short order, various NATO-aligned states led largely by the United States and European Union unveiled one of the most comprehensive and draconian sanctions packages in history.

Much less visible than the progress of Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield has been the impact of halted trade on Russia’s fiscal-military state and military-industrial capabilities. Moreover, it remains to be seen if financial disincentives can persuade Putin and his inner circle to change course, or if the Russian Federation’s strongman leader is persuaded by sheer military force alone.

This Stanford-US-Russia Forum (SURF) memorandum seeks to investigate the efficacy of Western-led sanctions regimes against the Russian Federation. We begin our inquiry with an overview of sanctions implemented after the start of the full-scale invasion and how these complemented existing sanctions responding to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. We next consider the impacts of economic sanctions on various interests of Russian industries and citizens in and outside of Russia. This paper next turns to various tactical and strategic shortcomings of historic Western sanctions strategies. Lastly, we seek to provide policy recommendations outside of those already recommended by the McFaul-Yermak sanctions working group.