As part of CDDRL’s weekly research seminar series, Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), delivered a talk on the challenge of bureaucratic authority and delegation. Fukuyama, known for his influential works on state-building and governance, used this talk to trace how scholars and policymakers have grappled with the tension between empowering bureaucracies to act effectively and ensuring they remain accountable to political leaders. The talk was not only a theoretical journey but also a response to current debates about the U.S. administrative state and what meaningful reform should look like.

Fukuyama began with the basics of organizational theory. He explained that hierarchies — systems where authority is ranked and flows from the top down — exist because they reduce "transaction costs," or the costs of coordinating and enforcing agreements between people. This insight, developed by economist Ronald Coase, shows why firms and governments prefer internal structures rather than always relying on markets. Oliver Williamson expanded this to explain how organizations manage uncertainty and complexity. Fukuyama then discussed libertarian ideas, which hoped that technology and open networks could flatten hierarchies. These visions, he noted, largely failed because real-world decisions still require clear lines of authority.

As organizations grew more complex, scholars turned to “principal-agent theory.” In this framework, a "principal" (such as an elected official) delegates tasks to an "agent" (like a bureaucrat), but must ensure the agent acts in their interest. Yet, as Herbert Simon and John DiIulio observed, bureaucrats are not simply self-interested — they are also shaped by professional norms, organizational culture, and personal values. Fukuyama stressed that delegation is unavoidable because lower-level agents often hold critical, local knowledge that distant leaders lack. As economist Friedrich Hayek argued, knowledge is dispersed in society, and central planners cannot predict every situation.

However, delegation creates a dilemma: how to give bureaucrats enough freedom to use their expertise, while still keeping them accountable. Formal mechanisms like audits and punishments help, but informal tools such as trust, shared values, and education are just as crucial. Fukuyama pointed to Japan’s "kanban" manufacturing system and military strategies like "mission orders," where frontline actors are trusted to make decisions based on shared goals.

A major paradox Fukuyama addressed is that while anti-corruption efforts seek to limit bureaucratic discretion, political science research shows that too much constraint stifles effectiveness. He proposed an "inverse-U curve," where both too little and too much autonomy harm performance. The right balance depends on the state’s overall capacity.

Applying this to the U.S., Fukuyama challenged claims that bureaucrats are "out of control." Instead, he argued that America’s federal bureaucracy is over-regulated, bogged down by rigid rules that prioritize compliance over results. His work with Katherine Bersch identifies five existing tools for political control, such as appointment and removal powers, showing that bureaucratic autonomy is already tightly managed.

Fukuyama concluded by advocating for genuine reform: deregulating the bureaucracy, empowering implementers to work alongside policymakers, and rebuilding internal state capacity. Inspired by agile management methods and Jennifer Pahlka’s Recoding America, he argued that a flexible, mission-driven public sector is essential to meet the complex challenges of modern governance.

A full recording of Professor Fukuyama's talk can be viewed below: