http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/Recent publications from CDDRLen-usPublic domainhttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/images/feed-icon-48x48.jpghttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/60http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22316Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN), Nov 10, 2008
MFAN's transition recommendations focused on immediate steps the Obama White House can take on modernizing foreign assistance]]>Mon, 17 Nov 2008 21:53:03 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22316?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22315Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN, Nov 10, 2008
A letter announcing MFAN's recommendations for President-elect Obama's transition team.]]>Mon, 17 Nov 2008 22:03:54 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22315?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22314Shorenstein APARC, distributed by the Brookings Institition Press, November 2008
]]>Wed, 17 Dec 2008 14:34:00 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22314?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22239Palgrave McMillan Press, forthcoming
]]>Thu, 02 Oct 2008 15:57:55 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22239?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22236CDDRL, July 2008
]]>Wed, 22 Oct 2008 11:47:53 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22236?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22231CDDRL Working Papers, July 2008
]]>Wed, 22 Oct 2008 11:48:04 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22231?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22230CDDRL Working Papers, September 2008
The 2005 elections in Azerbaijan qualify as a failed transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The ability of the Aliyev regime to maintain its hold on power reflected both internal and external factors. Although there is no way to judge the level of actual support for the government, Aliyev retained control of the security apparatus. Through its control of oil and gas revenues and the tight links between most business endeavors and politics, and its control of the broadcast media in particular, the regime was also able to prevent the opposition, which was more united than in previous elections, from mounting effective campaigns to mobilize citizens as voters or protestors. Thus, although the Aliyev regime was vulnerable along certain dimensions (sizable groups living in poverty amidst high economic growth and rampant corruption in particular), in others, it was not. The lack of clear outside interest in seeing regime change in Azerbaijan was another factor that worked in the regimes favor. Numerous external players were active in Azerbaijan, but most, including the United States, had relatively little interest in seeing the Aliyev government replaced by another. Consequently, they put little pressure on the government to hold free and fair elections or refrain from oppressing the opposition. Arguing that Azerbaijan needed evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, they put other, higher priority interests above democratization in Azerbaijan.]]>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 20:13:11 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22230?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22229CDDRL Working Papers, July 2008
What was the international impact on the Chilean transition to democracy? How much influence was there from international aid both from countries themselves as well as from organizations outside Chile? Where was this aid coming from, how was it manifesting itself, and what was its goal and to whom did it go? How significant was the organizational power of the opposition groups? Did they cooperate? Were they efficient? In the academic literature on the Chilean transition, we find that these questions have not been answered satisfactorily. The bias toward internal phenomena due to the influential lead roles played by local actors has caused interest to wane in regards to the international impact. Institutions from European countries, the United States, and Canada concentrated their efforts in conjoining the opposition to combat a regime that no longer had international legitimacy. Therefore, if we were to venture an explanation on this phenomenon we could see that there was a correlation between the internal and external events that assisted in inducing three elements that today are recognized as having been influential on the Chilean transition: a) the coordination between two sectors, which prior to the coup, were strongly antagonistic (the Socialist Party and Christian Democrats), b) the creation of a strong and functional organization of private research centers, which acted in parallel to the institutions that the regime interfered with (e.g.: universities), and c) the coordination between those who were exiled and those who were in the country, with the aim of preparing the transition to democracy.]]>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 20:13:39 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22229?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22227Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008
Jeremy Weinstein, Ames Habyarimana, assistant professor at Georgetown, Macartan Humphreys, assistant professor at Columbia, Daniel Posner, associate professor at UCLA, Richard Rosecrance, adjunct professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government andsenior fellow at the Belfer Center, and Arthur Stein, professor of Political Science at UCLA collectively respond to an article titled, "Us and Them," by Jerry Muller, professor at the Catholic University of America in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008. According to the authors, Muller's article "tells a disconcerting story about the potential for ethnic diversity to generate violent conflict. He argues that ethnic nationalism--which stems from a deeply felt need for each people to have its own state--"will continue to shape the world in the twenty-first century." In fact, Weinstein and his co-authors argue, ethnic differences are not inevitably, or even commonly, linked to violence on a grand scale]]>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 10:27:39 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22227?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22223U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sept 9, 2008
]]>Thu, 13 Nov 2008 19:28:26 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22223?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22220CDDRL Working Papers, July 2008
In this paper, we argue that although international influences played a significant role in Indonesia's democratic transition, Soeharto's demise was not the consequence of diplomatic pressure or other democracy-promoting interventions.]]>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 20:14:04 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22220?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22213CDDRL Working Papers, August 2008
Within the context of CDDRL's project on democratic transitions, this paper explores the causes for the failure of Algeria to democratize in the 1990s. Adhering to the project's common case study framework, the paper outlines the impact of long term structural variables before moving on to an examination of the domestic, then external variables that acted around the moment of potential transition in 1991-1992. In conclusion, the paper highlights the mutual interaction of domestic and external variables in explaining the "failed transition" outcome in the Algeria case.]]>Tue, 23 Sep 2008 11:57:47 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22213?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22209CDDRL Working Papers, July 2008
]]>Tue, 23 Sep 2008 11:56:27 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22209?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22208CDDRL Working Papers, May 2008
]]>Tue, 23 Sep 2008 11:56:17 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22208?http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22204Center for a New American Security Publications, July 2008
The next president of the United States must forge a new national security strategy in a world marked by enormous tumult and change and at a time when Americas international standing and strategic position are at an historic nadir. Many of our allies question our motives and methods; our enemies doubt American rhetoric and resolve. Now, more than at any time since the late 1940s, it is vital to chart a new direction for Americas global role.]]>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 11:17:54 PSThttp://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/22204?